CHAPTER 1. PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR ACTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Volume 2 focuses on the proposed development and construction of facilities and infrastructure to support the United States (U.S.) Marine Corps relocation to Guam. Volume 3 will analyze development and construction of facilities for training and operations occurring on Tinian (the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands [CNMI]). The main components of the proposed action in Volume 2 are as follows:

- Develop and construct facilities and infrastructure to support approximately 8,600 Marines and their 9,000 dependents relocated from Okinawa (Japan) to Guam.
- Develop and construct facilities and infrastructure to support training and operations on Guam for the relocated Marines.

The proposed action for the Marine Corps relocation includes personnel from the units being relocated and the associated base support personnel that must also be present at an installation to support the military mission.

This Volume is organized as follows:

Chapter 1:	Purpose of and Need for Actions. Presents the overarching purpose of, and need for, the proposed action and presents background information about the proposed action on Guam.
Chapter 2:	Proposed Action and Alternatives. Describes the siting criteria and the screening process to evaluate and identify the reasonable alternatives, the proposed action and reasonable alternatives, and the no-action alternative.
Chapters 3-19:	Resource Sections. Describes existing conditions and identifies potential impacts to the respective resources:
Chapter 3:	Geological and Soil Resources
Chapter 4:	Water Resources
Chapter 5:	Air Quality
Chapter 6:	Noise
Chapter 7:	Airspace
Chapter 8:	Land and Submerged Land Use
Chapter 9:	Recreational Resources
Chapter 10:	Terrestrial Biological Resources
Chapter 11:	Marine Biological Resources
Chapter 12:	Cultural Resources
Chapter 13:	Visual Resources
Chapter 14:	Marine Transportation. For a discussion of roadway transportation, please see Volume 6.
Chapter 15:	Utilities and Infrastructure
Chapter 16:	Socioeconomics and General Services
Chapter 17:	Hazardous Materials and Waste
Chapter 18:	Public Health and Safety

Chapter 19:Environmental Justice and Protection of ChildrenChapter 20:References

1.2 PURPOSE AND NEED

As discussed in Volume 1, the overarching purpose for the proposed actions is to locate U.S. military forces to meet international agreement and treaty requirements and to fulfill U.S. national security policy requirements to provide mutual defense, deter aggression, and dissuade coercion in the Western Pacific Region. The need for the proposed actions is to meet the following criteria based on U.S. policy, international agreements, and treaties:

- 1. Position U.S. forces to defend the homeland including the U.S. Pacific territories
- 2. Location within a timely response range
- 3. Maintain regional stability, peace and security
- 4. Maintain flexibility to respond to regional threats
- 5. Provide powerful U.S. presence in the Pacific region
- 6. Increase aircraft carrier presence in the Western Pacific
- 7. Defend U.S., Japan, and other allies' interests
- 8. Provide capabilities that enhance global mobility to meet contingencies around the world
- 9. Have a strong local command and control structure

Volume 1 provides detailed information regarding the international context for the Purpose and Need for the proposed action. The following summarizes the context for choosing the location to implement the proposed action.

Treaty and Alliance Requirements

In the Western Pacific Region, there are five of the seven worldwide, longstanding U.S. mutual defense treaties that contain alliance requirements. They are:

- U.S.– Philippines (1952)
- ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S. [1952])
- U.S.– Korea (1954)
- Southeast Asia Collective Defense (U.S., France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines [1955])
- U.S.–Japan (1960)

The U.S.–Japan (1960) treaty, known as the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*, (Mutual Security Treaty) is the most relevant to the proposed action. It contains general provisions on the further development of international cooperation and on improved future economic cooperation. Both parties assumed an obligation to maintain and develop their capacities to resist armed attack and assist each other in the event of an armed attack on either party in territories under Japanese administration. This provision is carefully crafted to be consistent with Japan's Constitution that limits its military capabilities to defensive capabilities only. The Agreed Minutes to the Treaty specify that the Japanese government must be consulted prior to major changes in U.S. force deployment in Japan and prior to the use of Japanese bases for combat operations, other than in defense of Japan itself. U.S. treaty commitments with the other nations listed above also require a timely response to incidents and a consistent U.S. presence of force as a deterrent in the Pacific Region.

In response to the evolving security environment in the Pacific Region, the DoD Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) initiatives began to focus on posture changes in the Pacific Region. These initiatives included reduction of overseas forces while striving to base forces in locations that support flexibility and speed of response to anywhere in an unpredictable environment. Based on the QDR recommendations for global repositioning and operational realignments in the Pacific Region, the Department of Defense began to identify suitable locations to relocate the Marine Corps from Okinawa that met: (1) treaty and alliance requirements; (2) response times to potential areas of conflict; and (3) freedom of action (use of base without restrictions).

In a parallel initiative with the IGPBS that began in December 2002, the U.S. engaged the Government of Japan (GoJ) in discussions to coordinate changes in U.S. force posture in Japan and the options on how best to coordinate those changes with other force realignments in the Pacific. Over a three and one-half-year period, the U.S. engaged with the GoJ in a series of sustained security consultations under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the preeminent treaty oversight body, composed of the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense. These talks, which came to be known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), were aimed at evolving the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance to reflect today's rapidly changing global security environment. The DPRI, which served as the primary venue for accomplishing U.S. IGPBS objectives regarding Japan, focused on alliance transformation at the strategic and operational levels, with particular attention to the posture of U.S. and Japanese alliance.

Ultimately, these discussions and negotiations resulted in an agreement known as the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA). In development of the ATARA, the U.S. and Japan confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation, the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan. These concepts include the following: (1) bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region; (2) the U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan and to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan; (3) the U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan; (4) U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, must be consistent to ensure appropriate responses when situations in areas surrounding Japan threaten to develop into armed attacks against Japan, or when an armed attack against Japan may occur; and (5) U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities and preparedness in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.

At the May 1, 2006, SCC meeting, the two nations recognized that the realignment initiatives described in the SCC document *U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation* (the "Roadmap") would lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation. The Roadmap outlined details of different realignment initiatives, including the relocation of the Marines and associated arrangements for cost sharing by the Japanese government. The Mutual Security Treaty and follow-on U.S.-Japan agreements require the U.S. to respond quickly to areas of potential conflict in the Asia-Pacific Region. Consistent with these obligations, the ATARA and Roadmap initiatives require relocating approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam with a target completion date of 2014. Moving these forces to Guam would place them on the furthest forward element of sovereign U.S. territory in the Pacific capable of supporting such a presence, thereby maximizing their freedom of action while minimizing the increase in their response time relative to their previous stationing in Okinawa.

Under the ATARA and Roadmap, Japan has agreed to a cost-sharing arrangement with the U.S. that would assist in funding up to \$6.09 billion of the facilities construction costs for the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. This cost-sharing agreement acknowledges that the Marine Corps forces on Guam would continue to support U.S. commitments to provide for the defense and security of Japan. These international commitments for funding and the locations of repositioned forces were reaffirmed on February 17, 2009 in the document titled: *Agreement Between the Government of the U.S. and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam* (Guam International Agreement), signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister. The Agreement was approved by the Japanese Diet on May 13, 2009 and transmitted to the U.S. Congress in accordance with each party's respective legal procedures.

In 2010, the U.S. and the GOJ continue their commitment to the Roadmap agreeement. In the 2010 QDR, DoD reaffirmed its commitment with Japan to continue to implement the Roadmap agreement ensuring a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transforming Guam, the westernmost sovereign territory of the United States, into a hub for security activities in the region. (DoD 2010). On May 28, 2010, the SCC issued a statement reconfirming that, in the 50th anniversary year of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains indispensable not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the SCC confirmed the commitment to implement the realignment initiatives described in the Roadmap.

Response Time

Basing locations in the Pacific Region were analyzed to determine those that would provide sufficient response times to potential areas of conflict to meet U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, including treaty commitments to Japan and other countries in the region. The U.S. locations in the Pacific Region considered for the military relocation were Hawaii, Alaska, California, and Guam. Non-U.S. locations considered included Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia, because they are U.S. allies and are well situated for strategic force deployment for permanent basing opportunities.

One of DoD's highest priorities, highlighted in the QDR, is maintaining the readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces. In general terms, readiness is the overall ability of forces to arrive on time where needed, and be sufficiently trained, equipped, and supported to effectively carry out assigned missions. Forces must be placed and maintained so that they can be utilized in a timely fashion. The desired distance from the potential threat can vary based on unit type and need, as well as mode of transport. Traditionally, forces were deployed in a slow steady buildup over time. This planning methodology was known as the time-phased force deployment process. Now, however, crises manifest themselves quickly in a variety of locations. Forces must be placed and maintained such that they can provide a rapid and timely response. Therefore, it is critical to locate forces so that the amount of time required to reach a crisis location is kept to a minimum.

Although forward-positioned forces in Korea have the lowest response times in the region, their mission is to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula and they historically have not been available to provide a readily deployable force to other locations in the region. Moreover, at the time of the DPRI negotiations, the U.S. was in separate negotiations to reduce presence in Korea. Forward-positioned forces on Guam provide significantly reduced response times to Pacific locations when compared to forces positioned in other U.S. locations and they can be readily deployed, unlike forces in Korea.

Freedom of Action

Freedom of action is the ability of the U.S. to use bases and training facilities freely and without restriction at a particular locale, as well as affording the U.S. the ability to engage in rapid force posture movements and contingency response from those locations. Freedom of action is variable based on the location of the action with the most flexibility being available at facilities and bases located on sovereign U.S. soil. Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and California are preferred over foreign countries because they provide the most flexibility for troops during times of maximum threat. However, to ensure the most strategic locations were considered as basing options, ,U.S. representatives through the IGPBS process consulted with representatives of U.S. allies in the Pacific Region who are well situated for strategic force deployment, and explored their willingness to host U.S. forces. A permanent basing location was sought because it would provide the greatest regional stability for the placement of military assets. Further, permanent bases, consistent with the host nation laws and policies, are much more likely to be developed to support the U.S. military's specific operational requirements. While amenable to various degrees of temporary basing or cooperative security agreements, the allies who were consulted were unwilling to allow permanent basing of U.S. forces on their soil.

The military's goal is to base forces where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host country. Because these countries within the region have indicated their unwillingness and inability to host more U.S. forces on their lands, the U.S. military has shifted its focus to basing on U.S. sovereign soil.

Summary of Global Alternatives Analysis for Proposed Marine Relocation

Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and California pose no limitation on freedom of action, and have available infrastructure. However, California, Alaska, and Hawaii all create significant strains on rapid response time, interoperability, and the U.S. ability to uphold treaties and protect other interests in the Asia-Pacific Region. Commitments under those treaties require that certain forces be within range to project power, to deter aggression, and dissuade coercion in the Western Pacific Region. In addition, Japan's clear willingness to fund the development of facilities to support the relocation of the Marines to Guam, as reaffirmed by the Japanese Diet in its recent ratification of the Guam International Agreement, reflected Japan's recognition of the continuing linkages between those forces and U.S. commitments to Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty. Also, Guam's distance to many of the likely contingency areas in the region is comparable to distances from the other potential allied countries in the Pacific Region considered for permanent basing, and is close enough to threats to employ rapid response capabilities and to implement the requirements of treaties. Finally, in contrast to Guam, which is U.S. sovereign soil that meets the freedom of action operational requirement for permanent basing, no consulted allied countries in the Pacific Region were willing to host a large additional contingent of U.S. forces on a permanent basis. In sum, the fundamental requirement to support the treaties and alliances that ensure peace and stability in the region, and the pressing need to reduce friction on Okinawa, make Guam the only location for the realignment of forces that meets all criteria.

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